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ACQUISITION OF BUSINESSES THROUGH PURCHASE OF
CORPORATE STOCK: AN ARGUMENT FOR EXCLUSION
FROM FEDERAL SECURITIES REGULATION
CHRISTINE L. MCANENY
I. INTRODUCTION
Until recently, it has been assumed that the sale of an incorpo-
rated business by means of a transfer of stock would fall within the
purview of the federal securities laws.' Since 1970, however, defen-
dants charged with securities violations in federal courts have ar-
gued "no jurisdiction" for this type of transaction.2 Arguing by
analogy from two Supreme Court decisions, s and from decisions in
promissory note cases4 and partnership cases,5 the contention has
been that, although the term "stock" is included within the statu-
tory definitions, corporate stock acquired incident to the purchase
of a business is not a "security" within the meaning of the Securi-
ties Act of 1933 (the 1933 Act)' and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (the 1934 Act).1
1. See, e.g., Matheson v. Armbrust, 284 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S.
870 (1961), where defendant selling 100% of corporate stock contested federal jurisdiction,
contending that the federal securities laws exclude private transactions taking place inde-
pendently of the national exchanges. The defendant did not contend, as do the defendants
in the principal cases of this comment, that stock is not a security when the transaction
involves the sale of a business.
2. Although the Securities Act of 1933 provides for concurrent state jurisdiction, 15
U.S.C. § 77r (1976), thus far only federal courts have examined the question addressed in
this comment.
3. United Hous. Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975); SEC v. W.J. Howey
Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
4. See, e.g., Emisco Indus., Inc. v. Pro's Inc., 543 F.2d 38 (7th Cir. 1976). See generally
cases cited in Annot., 39 A.L.R. Fed. 357 (1978).
5. See, e.g., Vincent v. Moench, 473 F.2d 430 (10th Cir. 1973).
6. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976). The term "security" is defined by the Securities Act of
1933 as follows:
When used in this subchapter, unless the context otherwise requires-
(1) The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, deben-
ture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-
sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or sub-
scription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certifi-
cate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other
mineral rights, or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a
"security," or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim
certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or
purchase, any of the foregoing.
15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1976).
7. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976). The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 defines the term
"security" as follows:
(a) When used in this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires-
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Typically, these stock transaction cases involve the sale of a
small business, i.e., a close corporation.8 Since this is a common-
place occurrence, determining whether a security is involved has
become significant not only to the securities specialist, but also to
any lawyer whose client wishes to purchase or sell an incorporated
business. In the event of alleged fraud in the sale, a federal forum
is frequently more advantageous for plaintiffs than a state forum.'
In addition, securities fraud provisions are more advantageous for
plaintiffs because they are broader in scope than common law rem-
(10) The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, deben-
ture, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement or in
any oil, gas, or other mineral royalty or lease, any collateral-trust certificate, pre-
organization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract,
voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit, for a security, or in general, any in-
strument commonly known as a "security"; or any certificate of interest or partici-
pation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, or warrant or right to
subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing; but shall not include currency or
any note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker's acceptance which has a maturity at
the time of issuance of not exceeding nine months, exclusive of days of grace, or
any renewal thereof the maturity of which is likewise limited.
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1976).
The definition of "security" under the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act is similar and the Su-
preme Court has treated the two definitions synonymously. See United Hous. Foundation,
Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 847 n.12 (1975). For purposes of this comment the two will be
treated as identical. Note also that the American Law Institute's proposed consolidated
Federal Securities Code does not substantially change the definition of a security:
Sec. 299.53. [Security.] (a) [General.] "Security" means a bond, debenture,
note, evidence of indebtedness, share in a company (whether or not transferable
or denominated "stock"), . . . investment contract, . . . or, in general, an interest
or instrument commonly considered to be a "security," . . . .
(b) [Exclusions.] Notwithstanding section 299.53(a), "security" does not in-
clude . . . a note or evidence of indebtedness issued in a primarily mercantile or
consumer, rather than investment, transaction not involving a distribution ....
ALl FED. SEC. CODE § 299.53(a), (b) (March 1978 Draft).
8. They may also involve the sale of a wholly owned subsidiary of a large corporation.
See Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Pat Ryan & Assocs., 496 F.2d 1255 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1023 (1974).
9. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides for exclusive federal jurisdiction and
has broad venue and nationwide service of process provisions. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1976). Fur-
thermore, attorneys' fees may be recovered by the successful litigant. See Mills v. Electric
Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 389-97 (1970), where the Supreme Court stated that an award
of attorneys' costs under § 14(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976), was allowable,
although not expressly authorized by the statute. But see Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wil-
derness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 241-43 (1975), where the circuit court, using a "private attorney
general" theory, awarded attorneys' fees in a suit brought under the Mineral Leasing Act, 30
U.S.C. § 185 (1976). The Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that, unless expressly author-
ized by statute, the general rule is that a successful party in federal litigation may not re-
cover attorneys' fees. 421 U.S. at 260-71.
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edies. 1° Therefore, a participant in a simple, face-to-face business
sale involving a stock transaction may well find himself in a federal
court defending a fraud action.
Seven reported federal cases have considered whether a transfer
of stock incident to the sale of a business falls within federal secur-
ities laws. 1 Only two appellate courts, however, have dealt with
this issue. The Tenth Circuit has concluded that the sale of a busi-
ness through a stock transfer is not a securities transaction, 2 while
the Fourth Circuit has reached the opposite result.'3
The premise of this comment is that stock transactions should
not automatically be deemed to be securities under federal law. A
distinction should be made between passive investors in corporate
stock, and purchasers and sellers of corporate businesses who use
stock as a means of transferring their interests. The federal securi-
10. Due to a liberal reading given by the courts, many actions are brought under SEC
Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1979), which was promulgated under the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(j) (1976). See, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United
States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972) (unlike common law fraud or deceit, reliance not a prerequisite
to recovery under rule 10b-5); Nelson v. Serwold, 576 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 970 (1978) (common law improper motive not required, rule lob-5 requires only knowl-
edge or recklessness); Baretge v. Barnett, 553 F.2d 290 (2d Cir. 1977) (privity between plain-
tiff and defendant not necessary under rule 10b-5); List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457
(2d Cir. 1965) (common law affirmative misrepresentation not required, under rule 10b-5
nondisclosure of material information is actionable); SEC v. Penn Central Co., 450 F. Supp.
908 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (rule 10b-5 causation defined with reference to proximate cause, result-
ing in broad liability). See also Campbell, Elements of Recovery Under Rule l0b-5: Scien-
ter, Reliance, and Plaintiff's Reasonable Conduct Requirement, 26 S.C. L. REv. 653 (1975).
For a discussion of common law difficulties, see Note, Franchising as a Security, 33 OHIO
ST. L.J. 718, 720 (1972); Note, The Prospects for Rule X-lOB-5: An Emerging Remedy for
Defrauded Investors, 59 YALE L.J. 1120, 1123-26 (1950). But see Newton, The Limits of
Liability: Recent Judicial Restrictions on Rule 10b-5, 6 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 63 (1978) sug-
gesting that recent Supreme Court decisions have narrowed the scope of federal securities
laws.
11. Coffin v. Polishing Machs., Inc., 596 F.2d 1202 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 142
(1979); Chandler v. Kew, Inc., [19791 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) V 96,966 (10th Cir. April 19,
1977); Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Pat Ryan & Assocs. 496 F.2d 1255 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1023 (1974); Titsch Printing, Inc. v. Hastings, 456 F. Supp. 445 (D.. Colo. 1978);
Bula v. Mansfield, [1979] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,964 (D. Colo. May 13, 1977); Bron-
stein v. Bronstein, 407 F. Supp. 925 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 320 F.
Supp. 539 (N.D. Il1. 1970). The Federal Securities Law Reporter recently published another
district court opinion holding that the transfer of stock incident to the sale of a business was
not a securities transaction. In Drueker v. Turner, [1980] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,386
(N.D. Ga. Dec. 28, 1979) the court relied on Chandler v. Kew and Bula v. Mansfield in so
holding.
12. Chandler v. Kew, Inc., [1979] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1 96,966 (10th Cir. April 19,
1977).
13. Coffin v. Polishing Machs., Inc., 596 F.2d 1202 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 142
(1979); Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Pat Ryan & Assocs., 496 F.2d 1255 (4th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 419 U.S. 1023 (1974).
298 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:295
ties laws should be construed to include within their purview only
stock purchased or sold by passive investors who rely on the exper-
tise of others for their profits. Initially, the two decisions excluding
stock transfers incident to the sale of businesses from federal se-
curities protections will be examined. Next, the cases holding that
these transactions are protected by federal laws will be analyzed.
Finally, an argument will be presented for the application of the
three-part investment contract formula to stock transfers. Applica-
tion of this formula would result in a functional rather than a for-
malistic determination of when stock constitutes a security. Pas-
sive investors would be protected by federal securities laws, while
transactions involving the simple acquisition of a business would
be relegated to state forums.
II. STOCK Is NOT NECESSARILY A "SECURITY"
In Chandler v. Kew, Inc.,14 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
upheld a district court ruling that the acquisition of a liquor store
through the purchase of 100% of the business's stock was not a
securities transaction within the definitions of the 1933 and 1934
Acts. In a brief, unpublished opinion the court cited United Hous-
ing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman,15 a Supreme Court case, as the
basis for its result. The Tenth Circuit noted that Forman had re-
jected a suggestion that all instruments called stock were securities
simply because they literally fell within the statutory definitions."
Relying on language in Forman to the effect that the application of
the securities laws must turn on the economic realities of a trans-
action,1 7 the court ruled that the plaintiff's motive was to buy a
liquor store. The transfer of stock, the court concluded, was simply
an indicium of ownership incident to the sale of the store.18
One month later, Chandler served as controlling precedent for
the Colorado district court in Bula v. Mansfield.19 That case in-
14. [1979] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,966 (10th Cir. April 19, 1977). Note, ten years
earlier, in Chiodo v. General Waterworks Corp., 380 F.2d 860, 863-64 (10th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 389 U.S. 1004 (1967), the Tenth Circuit indicated in dictum that the transfer of stock
incident to the sale of a business should not be included within the scope of federal securi-
ties laws.
15. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
16. [1979] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,966, at 96,054.
17. The Forman Court stated, "Because securities transactions are economic in charac-
ter Congress intended the application of these statutes to turn on the economic realities
underlying a transaction, and not on the name appended thereto." 421 U.S. at 849.
18. [1979] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 96,966, at 96,054.
19. [1979] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,964 (D. Colo. May 13, 1977).
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volved an attempted purchase of a restaurant through acquisition
of all the stock of the parent company. Plaintiffs alleged that the
fraud provisions of the 1934 Act were violated during the at-
tempted sale. The district court determined that federal jurisdic-
tion did not exist because the economic reality was that the plain-
tiffs had contracted to purchase a restaurant. 0 As in Chandler, the
stock constituted only an indicium of ownership of the
restaurant.'
The Chandler opinion was based substantially on the Supreme
Court's Forman decision. It should be noted, however, that the
facts in Chandler and the facts in Forman differ. Additionally,
Forman contains language which can be construed to support both
sides of the security-nonsecurity argument.
The Supreme Court in Forman was presented with the question
of whether shares of "stock" in a state-subsidized, nonprofit hous-
ing cooperative were securities.22 In order to acquire an apartment,
a purchaser bought shares of stock in the cooperative, the number
of shares purchased being dependent on the number of rooms de-
sired. A purchaser wishing to terminate his occupancy was re-
quired to offer the shares back to the cooperative at the original
price.1
The Supreme Court conducted a two-step analysis to determine
whether the stock in Forman was a security within the purview of
the federal acts. First, the Court rejected the notion that interests
designated as stock necessarily fall within the statutory definitions
of a security.2 4 The Court stressed that substance rather than form
must determine the meaning of a term like "security," and that
emphasis should therefore be placed upon the economic realities of
the transaction.2 5 The Court also noted that the shares in question
did not possess features typically associated with stock. They were
not negotiable, could not be pledged, conferred no voting rights,
paid no dividends, and could not increase in value.12
After determining that the shares were not stock in the tradi-
tional sense, the Court turned to the question of whether the
shares met the investment contract formula set forth twenty-nine
20. Id. at 96,052.
21. Id.
22. 421 U.S. at 840.
23. Id. at 842.
24. Id. at 848.
25. Id. (citing Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967)).
26. Id. at 851.
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years before in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co 2 7 "Investment contracts"
are included in the list of instruments designated as securities by
the federal definitions.2 8 In Howey, the Supreme Court applied a
three-part formula to determine whether the instruments in ques-
tion were investment contracts and therefore "securities" under
the federal acts. For an instrument to be classified an investment
contract Howey requires (1) an investment of money, (2) a com-
mon enterprise, and (3) an expectation of profits solely from the
efforts of others.2 9 While the Howey Court applied the formula to
investment contracts, the Forman Court indicated that the
formula was equally applicable to determining whether other in-
struments were securities.30 Applying the investment contract
analysis to the cooperative's stock, the Forman Court found that
there was no expectation of profits.31 The purchasers' motivation
was to acquire an apartment to live in, and not to reap a financial
return on an investment. Therefore, the Forman Court concluded
that the shares of stock were not securities.32
Forman demonstrates that, although "stock" is included in the
statutory list of securities instruments,3 stock may not always be a
"security" for federal purposes. As noted before, however, the facts
27. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
28. See notes 6, 7 supra.
29. 328 U.S. at 298-99. The Howey Company was engaged in selling narrow strips of
land in a citrus grove. The company told purchasers that it was not feasible to invest in the
grove without making service arrangements, and offered a service contract for the cultiva-
tion and marketing of the fruit grown on the land. Id. at 295. The issue was whether the
1933 Act applied to the Howey Company's operations. Id. at 297. The sale of land in con-
junction with a service contract is not a transaction which is usually characterized as a se-
curity. The Court, however, found that such transactions clearly involved investment con-
tracts because "something more" than a transfer of rights in land was involved. Id. at 299.
The purchasers had no interest in personally occupying or developing the land, but were
solely interested in making a profit. In actuality, management of the enterprise by the sell-
ers was part of the value of the investment. Id. at 300. Accordingly, the elements of an
investment contract were present since the investors provided the capital and shared in the
profits and the promoters controlled the enterprise. Thus, the 1933 Act was applicable. Id.
30. The Court stated that:
We perceive no distinction, for present purposes, between an "investment con-
tract" and an "instrument commonly known as a 'security.'" In either case, the
basic test for distinguishing the transaction from other commercial dealings is
"whether the scheme involves an investment of money in a common enterprise
with profits to come solely from the efforts of others .. " This test, in shorthand
form, embodies the essential attributes that run through all of the Court's deci-
sions defining a security.
421 U.S. at 851-52 (quoting Howey. 328 U.S. at 301).
31. Id. at 857.
32. Id. at 858.
33. See notes 6, 7 supra.
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in Forman are distinguishable from the facts before the Chandler
court. In Forman, plaintiffs were buying a place to live; in Chan-
dler, plaintiffs were buying an incorporated business. In Forman,
the Court first determined that what was called stock lacked some
traditional investment characteristics of stock. The Forman Court
then went on to make a determination based on economic realities
that the shares were not securities. In Chandler, while the court
correctly focused on the economic realities of the transaction, the
stock itself was not examined to determine whether traditional
characteristics were present.
Courts which have included the acquisition of businesses involv-
ing stock transfers within the purview of federal protections distin-
guish Forman on the basis that the stock in Forman did not pos-
sess traditional characteristics. 4 These courts have reasoned that
when stock transferred incident to the sale of businesses possesses
traditional characteristics, the economic realities of the transaction
need not be examined. Stock possessing traditional characteristics,
according to these courts, falls within the definition of a "security"
without the necessity of meeting the futher "investment contract"
requirement of Howey. As part IV of this comment will demon-
strate, labeling an instrument a security must be based upon an
investor-oriented analysis of the economic realities underlying the
transaction. The realistic approach, rather than a superficial deter-
mination of whether traditional characteristics are present, is the
major lesson of the Forman decision. Regrettably, the Chandler
court's short opinion is silent concerning the issue of whether the
presence or absence of traditional characteristics is significant. The
opinion is drawn in such conclusional terms that it provides small
comfort to defendants faced with an array of cases holding that
stock transactions involving the purchase of a business are always
securities.
III. STOCK Is A "SECURITY"
Subsequent to Bula, another judge in the District of Colorado
scrutinized the Forman decision more closely. In Titsch Printing,
Inc. v. Hastings,5 plaintiffs purchased all the stock of two family-
operated businesses. Defendants moved to dismiss the fraud action
34. See Coffin v. Polishing Machs., Inc., 596 F.2d 1202 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct.
142 (1979); Titsch Printing, Inc. v. Hastings, 456 F. Supp. 445 (D. Colo. 1978); Bronstein v.
Bronstein, 407 F. Supp. 925 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
35. 456 F. Supp. 445 (D. Colo. 1978).
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brought under the 1934 Act, contending that the stock was merely
an indicium of ownership and not a security.3 Unlike the Bula
court, the Titsch court did not summarily rule for the defendants
based on Chandler. Rather, the Titsch court found that the stock
exhibited the traditional characteristics listed by Forman, i.e., the
stock was negotiable, carried the right to receive dividends, con-
ferred voting rights, could be pledged, and could increase in
value. 7 On that basis the court purported to distinguish Chandler
by stating, "The stock in this case is not a mere 'indicia of owner-
ship' as found in Chandler v. Kew,. .. but rather the substance of
the purchase itself."38
The Titsch defendants alternatively contended that the invest-
ment contract formula of Forman must be applied to determine
whether any stock transaction fell within the securities laws.3 9 The
Titsch court agreed that there was language in the Forman deci-
sion to support the defendants' argument,40 but pointed out that
the Forman Court had first examined the stock for traditional
characteristics.," The investment contract formula was not applied
in Forman until after the Court determined that the stock in ques-
tion had no traditional characteristics. The Titsch court postulated
that the formula was developed because there was no commonly
accepted meaning of "investment contract.""' The court reasoned
that there was no need to use an investment contract analysis be-
cause "stock" has an accepted meaning, and because persons buy-
ing stock are entitled to assume they may rely on the protection of
the federal securities laws. Applying the traditional characteristics
test, the Titsch court determined that the acquisition of the corpo-
rate business by purchase of 100% of its stock was a federally gov-
erned securities transaction."3
One year prior to the Forman decision, the question of whether
the sale of a business through a stock transfer is a securities trans-
action for federal purposes was presented to the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals in Occidental Life Insurance Co. v. Pat Ryan &
36. Id. at 446.
37. Id. at 448.
38. Id. (citations omitted). No other distinction was made, although the facts of Chan-
dler and Titsch could hardly be closer; both involved the sale of businesses with 100% stock
transfers.
39. Id.
40. See Forman, 421 U.S. at 851-52, quoted at note 30 supra.
41. 456 F. Supp. at 448-49.
42. Id. at 449.
43. Id
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Associates." Occidental Life Insurance Company of North Caro-
lina (Occidental) agreed to sell the outstanding stock of a subsidi-
ary, Virginia Surety Company, Inc. (Surety), to Pat Ryan and As-
sociates, Inc. (Associates)." Surety was engaged in insuring long-
haul trucking activities, and Associates wished to purchase Surety
in order to use that company's state licenses to expand into other
states. The agreement contemplated that Surety would be stripped
of most of its assets and all of its liabilities prior to the sale. Its
only assets at the time of sale would be its charter, state licenses,
and bonds deposited with state insurance commissioners." After
the closing, both parties became dissatisfied with each other's con-
duct. Occidental sued for breach of contract in state court, but As-
sociates removed to federal court alleging, among other things, vio-
lation of the 1934 Act.47
Occidental claimed that the sale of stock was merely incidental
to the purchase of business assets. The purpose of the 1934 Act,
Occidental maintained, is to protect investors. Because the sale of
business assets is commercial in character, and not of an invest-
ment nature, the transaction should solely be a matter for state
regulation. Therefore, although literally covered by the federal se-
curities definitions, this sale of stock by Occidental should not be
deemed a securities transaction. 48 Occidental proposed that the in-
vestment contract analysis be uniformly applied to all instruments
used in sale transactions to determine whether a securities transac-
tion had occurred.49
The Fourth Circuit, however, rejected Occidental's proposal for a
44. 496 F.2d 1255 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1023 (1974). One other case, Bailey v.
Meister Brau., Inc., 320 F. Supp. 539 (N.D. Ill. 1970), considered whether the use of a stock
transfer to effectuate the sale of a business is within the purview of federal securities laws.
The defendants relied on Chiodo v. General Waterworks Corp., 380 F.2d 860 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1004 (1967), the Tenth Circuit predecessor of Chandler. The Bailey
court rejected Chiodo and held that the transaction was a sale of securities within the pur-
view of federal securities laws. 320 F. Supp. at 543-44.
45. Whether the sale of a business involves a securities transaction is a question which
usually arises in cases involving close corporations. Occidental, however, involved the
purchase and sale of a subsidiary corporation. A corporation may choose to buy another
corporate business through purchase of its outstanding stock. Under the investment con-
tract formula, the purchaser and the seller would not be relying on the efforts of others.
Rather, as sole purchaser and sole seller, they would be in direct control of the subsidiary.
Hence, under the formula, the sale of stock would not be a securities transaction, as between
them.
46. 496 F.2d at 1259.
47. Id. at 1260.
48. Id. at 1261.
49. Id.
1980]
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uniform analysis, finding that it ran counter to Supreme Court
statements that instruments literally fitting within the securities
definitions as a matter of law should be included within the federal
protections." Since Occidental chose to deal in stock, the federal
securities laws were held applicable. 1
In response to the argument that the sale of a business is a com-
mercial transaction that is properly regulated by state law, the
Fourth Circuit quoted Supreme Court language to the effect that
the 1934 Act is not limited to protecting organized markets, but
also extends to private transactions.2 In rejecting a public/private
dichotomy, however, the Fourth Circuit set up a straw man. It is
established law that the federal securities laws apply to private se-
curities transactions." The critical question before the court was
not whether the transaction was public or private, but whether a
security was involved in the transaction. If a security was not in-
volved, then none of the securities provisions would apply regard-
less of whether the transaction was public or private. Occidental's
claim that no securities transaction existed was based on the non-
investment character of the transaction, not on its private nature.
The Fourth Circuit acknowledged that Lino v. City Investing
Co.,54 a promissory note case, provided support for Occidental's
contention that a distinction should be made between purely com-
mercial, noninvestment transactions and investments protected by
federal securities laws. 6 In Lino, the plaintiff alleged that he was
induced to purchase franchise licensing agreements by material
misstatements made by the parent company in violation of the
federal securities laws." The federal laws were applicable, the
plaintiff contended, because promissory notes, given as part of the
consideration for the purchase, were securities within the Acts'
definitions. 57 The Lino court determined that the notes in question
were neither offered for sale to the public nor acquired by the de-
fendant for investment purposes. They were simply part of the
50. Id. (citing Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 339 (1967)).
51. Id. at 1263.
52. Id. at 1262 (citing Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6
(1971)).
53. See, e.g., Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971); Math-
eson v. Armbrust, 284 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1960).
54. 487 F.2d 689 (3d Cir. 1973).
55. Occidental, 496 F.2d at 1262 n.3.
56. 487 F.2d at 690.
57. Id.
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consideration given for the purchase of the franchise.58 Rather
than announcing a test for identifying a security in a transaction
involving promissory notes, the court emphasized that the facts in-
dicated the notes in question were commercial in character.5 '
Hence, although "notes" are instruments designated as securities
by the federal definitions,60 the commercial character of the notes
in Lino required the finding that the notes were not securities.61
Therefore, the transaction was governed by state law and the fed-
eral securities laws did not apply.
The Fourth Circuit concluded that Lino was inapplicable be-
cause the purchase of stock involved an investment and because
Occidental could have offered Surety to any member of the pub-
lic. 62 The purchase was held to be an investment because Associ-
ates wanted to buy an enterprise with a good reputation in order to
expand its business.6 8 Of course, every sale of a business, with or
without a stock transfer, involves a "public offering" and an "in-
vestment" in the sense that the Fourth Circuit used those terms.
Nevertheless, the court expressed concern that large investors, as
well as small investors, should be protected. A formula which re-
quires disparate treatment based on whether a small interest or a
controlling interest is purchased would, according to the court, be
arbitrary and capricious. " The fact that the parties could have
consummated their deal without the use of stock was irrelevant."
In summary, the Occidental ruling turned on two factors: (1) Su-
preme Court indications that stock may, as a matter of law, be se-
curities; and (2) judicial concern that any standard applied to
stock transfers distinguishing purely commercial transactions from
transactions covered by securities laws would be capricious.
The Fourth Circuit was next presented with this troublesome is-
sue in Coffin v. Polishing Machines, Inc." The defendant, desiring
58. Id. at 694-95.
59. The facts were (1) personal promissory notes were given for the purchase of
franchise licensing agreements, (2) there was no public offering, (3) the defrauded party was
the issuer of the notes, (4) the defendant did not procure the notes for investment, and (5)
the defendant was not soliciting venture capital. Id.
60. See notes 6, 7 supra.
61. 487 F.2d at 694. The court also indicated that an opposite holding would bring most
retail credit transactions within the purview of federal securities regulations. Id. at 695.
62. 496 F.2d at 1262 n.3.
63. Id. at 1263.
64. Id.
65. "The plain fact is that they did choose to use the stock." Id. (emphasis in original).
66. 596 F.2d 1202 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 142 (1979), rev'g Coffin v. Tricoli,
470 F. Supp. 7 (E.D. Va. 1977).
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to finance an expansion, encouraged the plaintiff to purchase stock
in the defendant's company. The plaintiff agreed to purchase half
of the outstanding shares and to serve as executive vice president
of the company. After the sale had taken place, the plaintiff dis-
covered that the company was insolvent. He subsequently brought
an action to recover damages under the federal securities acts. 7
The district court determined that although stock was involved,
the actual substance of the transaction was a purchase of a half-
interest in a business. 68 The district court held that the invest-
ment contract analysis used in Forman was applicable to all al-
leged securities transactions. 9 The Coffin transaction failed the in-
vestment contract test because the plaintiff was not relying solely
on the efforts of others for his profit, but had assumed a manage-
rial function in the business. Consequently, the stock was not a
security, and the court dismissed the case for lack of federal
jurisdiction.7 0
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that Forman re-
quires application of the investment contract analysis only when
the stock does not meet the traditional characteristics test.7 1 Citing
Occidental, the court stated it need not consider whether the out-
come would be different had the parties used some other form
(e.g., a partnership agreement) for their transaction .7 The court
also noted that the sale of stock in this case was for the purpose of
corporate expansion, "the very sort of transfer with which the fed-
eral securities laws are most concerned, 'the sale of securities to
raise capital for profit-making purposes.' ,,3s
Whether shares of stock are securities was also at issue in Bron-
stein v. Bronstein.7 4 Two brothers and their father each owned
one-third of a real estate development corporation's outstanding
shares. Both brothers were officers of the corporation, but the de-
fendant brother handled the financial matters of the business
while the plaintiff brother supervised the corporation's construc-
tion activities.7 5 The plaintiff alleged that federal securities laws
67. 470 F. Supp. at 8.
68. Id. at 9.
69. Id. at 10. See Forman, 421 U.S. at 851-52, quoted at note 30 supra.
70. 470 F. Supp. at 11-12.
71. 596 F.2d at 1204.
72. Id.
73. Id. (quoting Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 849 (1975)).
74. 407 F. Supp. 925 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
75. Id. at 926. The court indicated that the plaintiff completely relied upon his brother,
the defendant, for information regarding the value of the business' assets because of his
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were violated when the defendant induced him to sell his stock
without disclosing its true value.7"
The defendant relied on Forman, as well as on partnership and
promissory note cases, to support his argument that the invest-
ment contract analysis should be applied to the transaction. Under
that analysis, he contended, the stock transfer was not a security."
The district court distinguished Forman by quoting a passage
where the Forman Court, in analyzing the cooperative's stock for
traditional characteristics, stated:
In holding that the name given to an instrument is not disposi-
tive, we do not suggest that the name is wholly irrelevant to the
decision whether it is a security. There may be occasions when
the use of a traditional name such as 'stocks' or 'bonds' will lead a
purchaser justifiably to assume that the federal securities laws ap-
ply. This would clearly be the case when the underlying transac-
tion embodies some of the significant characteristics typically
associated with the named instrument.76
The Bronstein court noted that the corporation's stock possessed
all of the traditional attributes of stock.7 9 Hence, the cited Forman
language was applicable. The court concluded that the plaintiff
had a reasonable expectation that the federal securities laws would
apply.80 The court also stated that the investment contract analy-
sis requires an inquiry into corporate and shareholder relation-
ships. It observed that such extensive factual inquiry is inappropri-
inexperience with financial aspects of the business. In addition, the plaintiff was told by the
defendant not to retain his own attorney because the defendant, "as a brother, was looking
out for plaintiff's interests." Id.
76. Id. at 926-27. Note that in all of the previously mentioned cases the person claiming
to be defrauded was the purchaser. In Bronstein, however, the seller claimed to be de-
frauded. The federal antifraud provisions apply to both purchaser and seller under SEC
Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1979), and it appears that the investment contract analy-
sis is equally applicable to both. For a seller the test would be whether the seller had merely
a passive role in the enterprise or had exercised significant managerial efforts. For example,
a minority shareholder in a close corporation would clearly meet the investment contract
test and would be federally protected while a controlling shareholder might not be. In cases
similar to Bronstein, courts must analyze the facts to determine the extent of the share-
holder's relationship with the corporation. See generally Emisco Indus., Inc. v. Pro's, Inc.,
543 F.2d 38 (7th Cir. 1976) (both purchaser and seller contended that note given as partial
consideration was a security).
77. 407 F. Supp. at 927.
78. Id. at 928 (emphasis in original) (quoting Forman, 421 U.S. at 850-51).
79, Id. at 928-29.
80. Id. at 931.
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ate for determining the initial question of federal jurisdiction.8 1
That type of inquiry, Bronstein holds, is only required in Forman-
type cases where the stock does not exhibit traditional
characteristics.2
The defendant's reliance on cases which applied an investment
contract analysis to the sale of a partnership interest was dis-
missed by the Bronstein court. The fact that the plaintiff's interest
in the enterprise took the form of stock and not the form of "some
other less easily defined interest" was dispositive of the issue.8
The promissory note cases were distinguished by the court on
the basis that notes, unlike stock, may be of either a commercial or
an investment nature. Although literally within the definition of a
security, commercial notes are excluded from coverage because
federal securities laws were not intended to protect commercial
loan transactions."4 The court determined that shares of stock in a
business cannot have commercial characteristics because stock-
holders acquire their interests in order to participate in a profit-
making enterprise, not for personal use of the underlying inter-
est.8 5 In addition, the court expressed concern that application of
an investment contract analysis to shareholder situations could
lead to the exclusion of stock owned by persons holding manage-
ment positions from the protections of federal securities laws.6
The cases examined in the preceding discussion persuasively
support an argument that any sale of stock incident to the transfer
of ownership of a business is a securities transaction within the
protection of the federal laws. This conclusion, however, is not dic-
tated by the decisions of the Supreme Court. The compelling rea-
sons for a conclusion to the contrary are set forth below.
81. Id. at 929.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 930 n.4 (emphasis added).
84. Id. at 930.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 931. The court noted that such a conclusion would be contrary to precedent
regarding corporate insider liability. Id. In fact, decisions on insider liability, e.g., SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969), can be
read consistently with results achieved under the investment contract analysis. Where an
insider uses privileged knowledge to defraud through a stock transaction, whether the in-
sider exercises managerial control will be irrelevant. The focus should be on the party claim-
ing the protection of federal securities laws-the defrauded party. That party's control and
influence over the corporation will determine whether a security transaction exists. See note
76 supra. In most cases, the one defrauded will have either purchased or sold a minority
interest in the enterprise and accordingly, under the investment contract analysis, a securi-
ties transaction will exist.
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IV. AN ARGUMENT FOR THE APPLICATION OF THE INVESTMENT
CONTRACT ANALYSIS TO STOCK TRANSFERS
The section argues that a modified investment contract formula
should be applied to all stock transactions. The history of the
Howey formula supports this thesis. Prior to Howey, the Securities
Exchange Commission 87 and lower federal courts had used the
formula as a general definition for a security. 8 The Supreme Court
later appropriated the formula, using it in Howey to define the
specific term "investment contract."89 Along with "notes" and
"stock," the term "investment contract" is included within the
statutory list of instruments falling within the definition of a se-
curity.90 Thus, through Howey, the general security definition be-
came associated with one type of security instrument-investment
contracts.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed that economic reali-
ties and substance, rather than form, should govern the broader
question of what is a security."' The Court propounded the invest-
ment contract analysis to aid in determining the economic reality
of a transaction and has applied it in various situations. 2 If the
87. "[The Securities Exchange Commission] has suggested as a definition of the general
term 'security' the following: 'The investment of money with the expectation of profit
through the efforts of other persons.'" SEC v. Universal Serv. Ass'n, 106 F.2d 232, 237 (7th
Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 622 (1940).
88. See, e.g., SEC v. Universal Serv. Ass'n, 106 F.2d 232 (7th Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 308
U.S. 622 (1940); SEC v. Pyne, 33 F. Supp. 988 (D. Mass. 1940). For a history of the develop-
ment of the formula see Long, An Attempt to Return "Investment Contracts" to the Main-
stream of Securities Regulation, 24 OKLA. L. REv. 135, 146-59 (1971).
Commentators have called for uniform criteria to determine securities transactions. See
generally Coffey, The Economic Realities of a "Security". Is There a More Meaningful
Formula?, 18 W. REs. L. REV. 367 (1967); Long, supra at 173-74. Note, however, that Profes-
sor Long has suggested a formula that focuses on whether the instrument representing the
transaction grants the investor a right to participate in the direct management of the enter-
prise. If the instrument itself grants a right of direct control, the instrument is not a secur-
•ity. If the instrument does not grant a right to control the enterprise, then the instrument is
a security. See Long, supra at 170-71 & n.158. Majority shareholders, as a rule, will be in a
position to control their investments. The control results from owning a large block of votes,
not from a right specified in an individual share of stock. Therefore, since a share of stock
does not grant a right of direct control to the shareholder, stock transactions would always
be securities under Long's formulation. Although Professor Long calls for a uniform test
based on "meaningful" criteria, he ultimately arrives at a mechanical formula where form,
once again, is elevated over substance.
89. 328 U.S. at 298-99.
90. See notes 6, 7 supra.
91. See, e.g., Howey, 328 U.S. at 298.
92. See, e.g., Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967) (applying investment contract
test to withdrawable capital shares).
310 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:295
investment contract analysis generalizes the relevant economic re-
alities in a transaction using securities (and the Court has indi-
cated that it does)93 then it should be equally applicable to the
testing of stock transactions for securities purposes. Thus, the use
of the analysis should not be restricted solely to definition of the
term "investment contract."
To reiterate, the Howey formula is an investment of money, in a
common enterprise, with an expectation of profits to be derived
solely from the efforts of others. Since the elements of the formula
have been exhaustively treated by commentators, 4 the following
discussion will focus only on the third element of the test-profits
to be derived solely from the efforts of others. In cases involving
stock transfers incident to the sales of businesses, this element will
most frequently determine whether the securities laws apply.
The modern trend among federal and state courts has been to
modify the Howey formula's third element.9 5 Rather than exclud-
ing all investors who contribute their own efforts toward the suc-
cess of their investments from the securities protections, the courts
have focused on the quality of effort that the investor contributes
to the enterprise. Thus, in SEC v. Glen W. Turner Enterprises,
Inc.," the Ninth Circuit adopted a more flexible test: "[W]hether
the efforts made by those other than the investor are the undenia-
bly significant ones, those essential managerial efforts which affect
the failure or success of the enterprise." This approach is compati-
ble with the Supreme Court's intent in Howey. For example, in
Forman the Court referred to the essential attributes of a security
as "the presence of an investment in a common venture premised
on a reasonable expectation of profits to be derived from the en-
trepreneurial or managerial efforts of others."'9
93. See Forman, 421 U.S. at 851-52, quoted at note 30 supra.
94. See, e.g., Coffey, note 88 supra; Long, note 88 supra; Newton, What is a Security?: A
Critical Analysis, 48 Miss. L.J. 167 (1977).
95. See generally Newton, supra note 94, at 192-98.
96. 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973). Turner is the leading
federal court decision modifying the Howey formula. See generally Comment, What Is a
Security? Howey, Turner Enterprises, and Franchise Agreements, 22 KAN. L. REv. 55, 70-
78 (1973). State courts have suggested other tests and/or modifications of Howey for a de-
termination of a securities transaction. See, e.g., Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 13
Cal. Rptr. 186 (1961) (en banc); State v. Hawaii Market Center, Inc., 485 P.2d 105 (Haw.
1971).
97. 421 U.S. at 852. Language in Howey also reflects this approach: "Thus all the ele-
ments of a profit-seeking business venture are present here. The investors provide the capi-
tal and share in the earnings and profits; the promoters manage, control and operate the
enterprise." 328 U.S. at 300 (emphasis added).
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The modified Howey formula is also consistent with the pur-
poses of the federal securities laws which were enacted in response
to the national crisis following the stock market crash of 1929.98
The philosophy behind the acts is one of full disclosure." Investors
who rely upon others for the profits they expect to earn from their
investments are thus protected by the disclosure and fraud provi-
sions of the securities acts. Participating investors who manage or
who retain practical control over the enterprise presumably have
access to essential information and are in a position to control the
success of their investment.'00 Hence, the third part of the modi-
fied Howey formula excludes participating investors from securi-
ties protections. Federal protection is properly limited by the man-
agerial efforts element to those lacking practical control over their
investments.' 0 ' One area where courts routinely apply the manage-
rial efforts element to limit the scope of federal protection is in
partnership transactions. 10 2  For example, general partnerships
have been held not to constitute a security because the partners do
not rely on the managerial efforts of others for their profits.103
Limited partners, on the other hand, do rely on the managerial
efforts of others to realize a return on their investment and so are
included within the protections of the acts. 10 The business rela-
tionships of the parties in Coffin and Bronstein were similar to
partnerships. The parties could have achieved the same distribu-
tion of managerial functions and the same fractional interests in
the businesses through a partnership, instead of a corporate form.
Had a partnership been chosen, the fact patterns of the two cases,
98. See generally L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 119-21 (Temp. Student Ed. 1961).
99. See generally L. Loss, supra note 98, at 121-28.
100. See, e.g., Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1943), cert.
denied, 321 U.S. 786 (1944) ("The essential objective of securities legislation is to protect
those who do not know market conditions from the overreachings of those who do."); Hirsch
v. duPont, 396 F. Supp. 1214, 1224 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd, 553 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1977)
("[W]here the investor obtains managerial control and thereby gains access to information
• . . he has less need of the protection . . . of the securities laws.").
101. See generally Newton, supra note 94, at 187-88.
102. See generally Long, Partnership, Limited Partnership, and Joint Venture Inter-
ests as Securities, 37 Mo. L. REV. 581 (1972).
103. See, e.g., Vincent v. Moench, 473 F.2d 430 (10th Cir. 1973); Hirsch v. duPont, 396
F. Supp. 1214 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), af'd, 553 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1977); Romney v. Richard Prows,
Inc., 289 F. Supp. 313 (D. Utah 1968). Where the general partnership actually involves con-
trol over the enterprise by some partners, to the exclusion of other partners, a security will
be found to exist. See Pawgan v. Silverstein, 265 F. Supp. 898 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
104. See, e.g., Murphey v. Hillwood Villa Assocs., 411 F. Supp. 287 (S.D.N.Y. 1976);
Kroungold v. Triester, 407 F. Supp. 414 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 521 F.2d 763 (3d Cir. 1975); Hirsch
v. duPont, 396 F. Supp. 1214 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd, 553 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1977).
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rather than the form of the business relationship, would have de-
termined their results. In Coffin, the plaintiff was to share equally
in the management of the business. Therefore, under the manage-
rial efforts test the transaction would not be a security regulated
by federal law. In Bronstein, although the plaintiff owned one-
third of the business, as a field supervisor he may not have had
access to the management records of the business. If the manage-
rial efforts of his brother, the defendant, were the "undeniably sig-
nificant ones," this transaction would fall within the securities acts.
Of course, this type of approach requires the courts to examine
the facts of each case. The Bronstein court, however, was reluctant
to delve beyond the label "stock" to make a threshold jurisdic-
tional determination. 10 5 The argument that an examination of facts
is not appropriate or desirable when making a determination of
jurisdiction has little merit when one considers that factual exami-
nations are routinely made in partnership and promissory note
cases for jurisdictional purposes.
Some courts have also claimed that application of the invest-
ment contract analysis to stock transactions will lead to arbitrary
results. For example, the Occidental court expressed concern that
small interests and controlling interests would be treated differ-
ently.108 In one sense this concern may be justified. The investment
contract formula mandates individualized treatment based upon
the facts of the case. The applicability of federal securities laws
will depend on whether the investor exercises significant manage-
rial functions in the enterprise. 10 7 This test requires courts to ex-
amine the degree of managerial control to be exercised by the in-
vestor. The analysis will be more difficult because the line
separating securities from nonsecurities will not be clear-cut. Func-
tional, rather than formal dependency will become the touchstone
of decision. The consistency achieved by automatically characteriz-
ing all stock as "securities" will be lost. But the form of a business
relationship should not determine the applicability of federal laws.
Whether the relationship takes the form of a partnership, an out-
right sale of the business' assets, or an acquisition of a business
through a stock purchase, the transaction should be governed by
the same criteria. Use of the investment contract analysis will re-
sult in more uniform treatment for equitably similar transactions.
105. 407 F. Supp. at 929.
106. 496 F.2d at 1263.
107. Witness the possible divergent outcomes in Bronstein and Coffin under an invest-
ment contract approach.
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This approach has been taken by courts in promissory note
cases. Notes, like stock, are instruments literally included in the
statutory definitions of a security.'08 Courts, however, have used
the investment contract analysis in promissory note cases to deter-
mine securities act coverage in accordance with the economic reali-
ties of the transaction.10 9 The Seventh Circuit's decision in Emisco
Industries, Inc. v. Pro's, Inc.'10 demonstrates the application of the
investment contract analysis to a promissory note. In Emisco, the
plaintiff company purchased a business from the defendant com-
pany. As part of the payment for the assets of the business, the
plaintiff gave the defendant a promissory note. After the purchase,
the plaintiff brought suit in federal court claiming that material
misrepresentations had been made regarding the business.' The
Seventh Circuit stated that although the statutory definition in-
cludes "any note" within its terms, the beginning phrase of the
definition is "unless the context otherwise requires.""'' ' Therefore,
not all notes are securities; whether a particular note is a security
depends on the factual context of the case. '3
The plaintiff argued that the investment in the assets of the bus-
iness should be protected by securities laws. The managerial efforts
criterion of the investment contract formula had been met, the
plaintiff company argued, because it had relied on the defendant's
past efforts (to build up the business of the company) in deciding
to acquire it and assume control." The court stated that past ef-
forts would not satisfy the test: "The important element for the
transaction to constitute an investment is that [the plaintiff] relied
on present and future efforts of another to produce profits.'1 Be-
cause the plaintiff had purchased the business and planned to op-
erate it, he was not relying on the present or future efforts of some-
108. Note that the 1934 Act expressly excludes short-term commercial paper (i.e., prom-
issory notes with a maturity date within 9 months of issuance) from the definition of a
security. See note 7 supra. The 1933 Act, on the other hand, does not exclude short-term
paper from the statutory definition of a security, see note 6 supra, but the Act does exempt
it from registration. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(3) (1976).
109. See, e.g., Oliver v. Bostetter, 426 F. Supp. 1082 (D. Md. 1977); Tri-County State
Bank v. Hertz, 418 F. Supp. 332 (M.D. Pa. 1976); Sea Pines of Virginia, Inc. v. PLD, Ltd.,
399 F. Supp. 708 (M.D. Fla. 1975). But see Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Touche Ross & Co., 544
F.2d 1126, 1136 (2d Cir. 1976).
110. 543 F.2d 38 (7th Cir. 1976).
111. Id. at 39.
112. Id. See notes 6, 7 supra.
113. 543 F.2d at 39.
114. Id. at 40.
115. Id. at 41.
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one else. Therefore, the court held that the note was not a
security. " 6
The facts of Emisco are similar to the facts of Titsch and Occi-
dental. In all three cases the sale of an ongoing business was con-
templated, and an instrument literally covered by the securities
definitions was used. But in Titsch and Occidental the instru-
ment's label precluded further inquiry, while in Emisco the court
held that the language "unless the context otherwise requires"
mandates an examination of the factual context in which the in-
strument is used.
The approach taken in Emisco would seem to be an equally
valid approach in stock transfer cases, but courts have not yet ap-
plied the investment contract analysis to stock transfers.1 1 7 Deci-
sions that the investment contract formula is inappropriate be-
cause "stock" is an instrument explicitly named in the federal
statutes have relied heavily on Supreme Court dicta that instru-
ments may "as a matter of law" be securities. 18 Therefore, in or-
der to evaluate the rejection of the investment contract analysis by
these courts, an examination of the Supreme Court's treatment of
the analysis will be necessary.
In SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp.," 9 the Supreme Court de-
clined to establish a general definition either for "securities" or
"investment contracts." The question presented was whether the
sale of assignments of oil leases in conjunction with a promise to
drill exploratory wells was a securities transaction.2 0 The Joiner
company argued it was simply selling leasehold interests and that
since such instruments were not mentioned in the statutory defini-
tion, they were not securities. 2' The Court indicated that the exis-
tence of a security is not determined by the nature of the assets
underlying the instrument but by "what character the instrument
is given in commerce by the terms of the offer, the plan of distribu-
116. Id.
117. In Chandler and Bula, the two decisions holding that acquisition of a business
through a stock purchase is not a security, the three-part investment contract analysis was
not used. Rather, both courts simply focused on the underlying transaction. Because the
underlying transaction in each case was actually the sale of a business, the courts held that a
security transaction did not exist.
118. See SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943); Tcherepnin v.
Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 339 (1967) (citing Joiner).
119. 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
120. Id. at 348.
121. Id. at 350.
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tion, and the economic inducements held out to the prospect." 2 2
In dictum the Court also stated that instruments may, as a matter
of law, be within the definition, "if on their face they answer to the
name or description."1 2 3
Three years later, in Howey, the Supreme Court set forth the
investment contract formula. The Court stressed the protective
function of securities acts and suggested that economic realities
should govern whether a transaction is a security. 2' The facts of
Joiner and Howey are similar; in both cases the defendants con-
tended that the underlying transactions were interests in land and
therefore were not securities. " The Court, however, concluded in
both cases that more than land was involved; the promoters were
promising to develop the interest after the sale and the purchasers
were relying on those promises for a return on their investment.12
This accounts for the statement that security status is determined
by the "character the instrument is given in commerce" and not by
the assets underlying the instrument. Joiner did not involve a sim-
ple sale of a leasehold interest since the promoters were making
promises for future development. Howey was similarly concerned
with promoters' promises that they would further develop the "as-
sets" after the sale. The Howey Court pointed to the distinction
between a simple commercial transaction and the sale of a security
in its statement that "[the plaintiffs] have no desire to occupy the
land or to develop it themselves; they are attracted solely by the
prospects of a return on their investment. 1 27
When the sale of an entire business is made by means of a stock
transfer, the "character of the instrument in commerce" should
not be interpreted to mean that stock containing "traditional char-
acteristics" is automatically a security. If inducements to purchas-
ers of further development do not accompany the sale of a business
interest, that sale should not be considered a security for purposes
of federal securities laws.
In both Howey and Joiner, the Court examined the underlying
circumstances of the transactions and determined that securities,
not simple commercial transactions, were involved. In Forman, the
Court also examined the underlying elements of the transaction,
122. Id. at 352-53.
123. Id. at 351.
124. Howey, 328 U.S. at 298-99. See generally note 29 supra.
125. Joiner, 320 U.S. at 352; Howey, 328 U.S. at 299.
126. Joiner, 320 U.S. at 348; Howey, 328 U.S. at 299.
127. 328 U.S. at 300.
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but this time excluded the transaction using essentially the same
functional securities definition. A security transaction is not pre-
sent, the Court noted, where the purchaser buys property for his
personal use. '2  The Court pointed out that the observation in
Joiner that instruments as a matter of law may be securities was
merely dictum; an absolute barrier to inquiry into the economic
realities underlying a transaction had not been thereby es-
tablished. 129
The courts which rely on Forman as authority to include stock
as a security point out that the Court first focused on the tradi-
tional characteristics of the stock. In addition, the Supreme
Court's concern that the term "stock" will lead a purchaser to rely
on the protection of the securities laws when the "underlying
transaction embodies some of the significant characteristics typi-
cally associated with the named instrument," has been deemed
important.8 0
The Forman Court, however, did not hold that automatic inclu-
sion results when traditional characteristics of stock are present. In
fact, the literal approach was rejected by the Forman Court's1 and
the Court stressed economic realities both when it analyzed the
stock for traditional characteristics and when it analyzed the stock
under the investment contract formula.18 2 If the economic realities
demonstrate that the investor is not relying on the significant man-
agerial efforts of others, the stock should not be held to be a secur-
ity for federal purposes.
An obstacle to the above analysis is the Court's dictum in For-
man that the name given an instrument is relevant where the ac-
companying characteristics might cause a plaintiff to believe that
federal securities laws apply. 8 Nevertheless, a plaintiff's reliance
on securities protections should not be assumed in sales of small
businesses. Most purchasers will not consider whether federal se-
128. 421 U.S. at 858.
129. Id. at 850.
130. See Bronstein, 407 F. Supp. at 931.
131. The Court stated, "We reject at the outset any suggestion that the present transac-
tion, evidenced by the sale of shares called 'stock,' must be considered a security transaction
simply because the statutory definition of a security includes the words 'any . . . stock.'"
Id. at 848 (footnote omitted). Furthermore, the Court supported its rejection of the literal
approach to stock transactions by referring to the analogous promissory note cases. Id. at
849 n.14.
132. Id. at 848, 851. The Forman Court also indicated that no difference exists between
an investment contract and the generic term "security." Id. at 852, quoted at note 30 supra.
133. Id. at 850-51.
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curities laws are applicable. Certainly such concerns are not of top
priority during the negotiation phase of a business deal. Only when
the deal turns sour and a plaintiff attempts to find a remedy will
the federal laws, and their protections, come to mind. Conse-
quently, it is highly artificial for courts to presume that such reli-
ance exists.134 Only the investment contract analysis should be uti-
lized to determine whether a particular stock transaction makes a
party an investor, and thereby justifies treatment of the stock or
other assets as a "security" for federal purposes.
V. CONCLUSION
One commentator has suggested that the day may come "when it
will be said of securities laws-as it has been similarly said of
heaven [and] the Internal Revenue Code, . . . that 'not a sparrow
falls without the securities laws nodding their assent.' "185 But re-
cent Supreme Court decisions have indicated a desire to restrict
the scope of the securities laws to the purposes for which the acts
were designed.18 6 Since the investment contract formula is
designed to effectuate the purposes of the securities acts, the
formula should be applied to exclude from federal regulation all
transactions involving a stock transfer that is merely incidental to
the acquisition of a business.
134. On the other hand, proof of actual reliance on federal protections, (e.g., the pro-
moter's inducements include a claim that the securities laws apply) probably should be con-
sidered when determining whether federal law applies.
135. Coffey, supra note 88, at 368 n.9.
136. See generally Lowenfels, Recent Supreme Court Decisions Under the Federal Se-
curities Laws: The Pendulum Swings, 65 GEo. L. J. 891 (1977); Newton, note 10 supra.
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